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Sharing Stupid $h*t With Friends and
Followers: The First Amendment Rights of
College Athletes to Use Social Media
Professor Meg Penrose*
I. THE QUESTION
May state universities restrict or place limitations on their student-ath-
letes' use of social media without running afoul of the First Amendment?' It
is a given that state actors, which includes a state university's athletic depart-
ment and its individual coaches, are bound by the First Amendment.2 Institu-
tional rules and regulations restricting speech or expression imposed by a
coach or athletic director will undoubtedly implicate the First Amendment.3
But, does implicating the First Amendment in this setting mean that coaches'
rules and regulations regarding speech and expression violate the Constitu-
tion? Many argue yes. However, as former Coach Leo Corso of ESPN Col-
lege Gameday fame is quick to respond: "Not so fast my friends."
The answer to this simple question is rather complex and quite uncer-
tain, because implicating the First Amendment is not the same thing as vio-
lating the First Amendment.4 Many laws implicate First Amendment rights,
yet do not violate them.5 As the Supreme Court explained, the First Amend-
ment has "never been thought to give absolute protection to every individual
to speak whenever or wherever he pleases or to use any form of address in
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wonderful Symposium. Particular thanks to the Executive Board and John and
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shop hosted by Professor Matt Parlow. A special thanks to Professor Parlow
and the esteemed participants including Professors Dionne Koeller, Adam Ep-
stein, Nathanial Grow, Geoff Rapp, Marc Edlemen, Gordon Hylton, Patricia
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solely to the author.
I. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
2. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988) ("A
state university without question is a state actor.").
3. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (incorporating, for the
first time, the First Amendment via the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to
state legislation as well as federal legislation).
4. See Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 803-04 (1984).
5. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989).
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any circumstances that he chooses."6 Our employment, our status (e.g., being
a student or military member), and our form and context of expression all
work its way into the First Amendment analysis.7 While a person may freely
peruse pornography in the privacy and comfort of his or her home,8 the gov-
ernment may curtail this right in other settings, like a school or prison.9 Like-
wise, a person may yell at a family member or friend, but articulating truly
threatening acts may result in criminal prosecution.10 In short, when it comes
to speech, context matters."] Athletics presents a very unique context for
speech and expression. There are endless examples of athletes being disci-
6. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971).
7. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 400 (2007) (upholding school dis-
cipline against student holding up a sign reading "BONG hits 4 Jesus" across
from school property); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,
686-87 (1986) (upholding school discipline for "lewd" speech made during a
student assembly); Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 817 (permitting the out-
lawing of signs that created a visual blight); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348,
361 (1980) (upholding military regulation prohibiting service members from
distributing or posting materials on an Air Force base without prior approval);
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 761 (1974) (upholding court martial of military
member whose speech was found to undermine Vietnam war efforts); Picker-
ing v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) ("[A] teacher's exercise of his
right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his
dismissal from public employment."); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,
52 (1919) (wherein Justice Holmes famously proclaimed, "The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire is a
theater and causing a panic.").
8. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (Justice Marshall exclaimed,
"If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business
telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what
films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of
giving government the power to control men's minds.").
9. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404 (1989) (upholding federal prison
rules that empower wardens to prohibit any publication found "detrimental to
the security, good order, or discipline of the institution or if it might facilitate
criminal activity."); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686-87 (upholding school discipline
for "lewd" speech made during a student assembly).
10. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
11. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (disallowing monetary
damages for inflammatory speech on protestors' placards during a military fu-
neral); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (KKK member's
conviction under Ohio law reversed because advocating violence does not
equate planning for violence); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)
(finding a war protester's threat against then-President Lyndon Johnson
deemed "political hyperbole" and therefore not capable of being criminally
prosecuted).
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plined by state universities (which is tantamount to state action) for speech.12
For example, Florida State suspended Jameis Winston, a quarterback and
Heisman trophy winner, for allegedly standing on a table in the student union
repeating a common internet meme: "Fuck her right in the pussy."13 This
penalty implicates the First Amendment as the school did not discipline him
academically, but did implement athletic discipline.14
How does a court accurately assess the First Amendment rights of stu-
dent-athletes at public universities? Courts consider context and, specifically,
the unique situation of the college athlete. College athletes are most assur-
edly students, but they are not merely students. College athletes are qualita-
tively distinct from the traditional college student, both from a regulatory and
constitutional perspective. College athletes do more than attend class and
seek degrees. College athletes seek championships. It is this unique status as
an athlete that empowers coaches to require more of student-athletes than
professors expect from the traditional college student. Simply put, college
athletes are special and different when it comes to the college experience.
The student-athlete wears dual hats, one as student and another as athlete.
Their speech and expression rights fluctuate depending on which hat they are
wearing.
This paper takes a closer look at the First Amendment rights of college
athletes to access social media while simultaneously participating in intercol-
legiate athletics. The question posed is quite simple: can a coach or athletic
department at a public university legally restrict a student-athlete's use of
social media? If so, does the First Amendment provide any restraints on the
type or length of restrictions that can be imposed? Thus far, neither question
has been presented to a court for resolution. However, the answers are vital,
as college coaches and athletic directors seek to regulate their athletes in a
constitutional manner.
Nearly every college athletic program reminds its athletes that partici-
pating in intermural athletics is a privilege, not a right.'5 Framing participa-
tion as a "privilege" does not automatically diminish-and should not
diminish-the Constitutional rights of a student-athlete. Athletics are about
winning, teamwork, and sport. Can these values, which seek to sacrifice indi-
viduality for the good of the team, coexist with First Amendment rights?
12. See, e.g., Dan Wolken, Florida State Suspends Jameis Winston for Clemson
Game, USA TODAY, Sept. 20, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/
ncaaf/2014/09/1 9/j ameis-winston-suspended-florida-state-seminoles-football-
clemson-tigers/15930703/.
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. See, e.g., STUDENT ATHLETE SUPPORT SERV., MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK AND PLANNER 23 (2013-2014 ed. 2013), avail-
able at http://sass.msu.edu/academic/documents/FS12handbook.pdf.
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II. THE MYTH OF ATHLETIC EXPRESSION-THE "PRIVILEGE"
OF PARTICIPATING
Do not have a false sense of security about your rights to freedom
of speech. Understand that freedom of speech is not unlimited.
The on-line social network sites are NOT a place where you can
say and do whatever you want without repercussions. 16
These are the words and sentiments of many Division I athletic pro-
grams. 17 Such pronouncements seem very carefully constructed to suggest
support for speech in the abstract, while making it clear that the school will
actually limit speech and expression rights with possible repercussions and
penalties.18 This apparent assurance is NOT a full commitment to First
Amendment principles of speech and expression. When it comes to social
media, student-athletes are receiving mixed messages. On the one hand, stu-
dent-athletes have the freedom to speak. But, using that freedom could cost
them everything related to their athletic experience, including playing time
and their scholarship.19 This is a far cry from the extensive First Amendment
protections usually afforded to traditional college students.O
16. FLA. STATE UNIV., PUBLIC MEDIA AND SOCIAL NETWORK POLICY FOR STU-
DENT-ATHLETES 2 [hereinafter FLORIDA STATE PUBLIC MEDIA AND SOCIAL
NETWORK POLICY] (emphasis in original), available at http://www.document
cloud.org/documents/ 1087501 -florida-state-policy.html (requiring student-ath-
lete signature); OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK
6 (2013-2014 ed. 2013) -[hereinafter OKLAHOMA STATE STUDENT-ATHLETE
HANDBOOK] (emphasis in original), available at http://www.document
cloud.org/documents/ I 087506-oklahoma-state-policy.html (showing that the
identical language is apparently written or advised by the same individual or
firm).
17. See, e.g., FLORIDA STATE PUBLIC MEDIA AND SOCIAL NETWORK POLICY, supra
note 16, at 2; OKLAHOMA STATE STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK, supra note
16, at 6.
18. See FLORIDA STATE PUBLIC MEDIA AND SOCIAL NETWORK POLICY, supra note
16, at 2; OKLAHOMA STATE STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at
6.
19. See, e.g., Marcum v. Dahl, 658 F.2d 731, 734-35 (10th Cir. 1981) (upholding
University of Oklahoma's legal right to withdraw the athletic scholarships of
basketball players that publically criticized their coach); Williams v. Eaton, 468
F.2d 1079, 1083-84 (10th Cir. 1972) (upholding dismissal of University of
Wyoming football players after a dispute regarding the wearing of black arm
bands during a game with Brigham Young University).
20. Cf Papish v. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 667-71 (1973)
(per curiam) (overturning a journalism student's expulsion, on First Amend-
ment grounds, for publishing a story titled "Mother Fucker Acquitted." The
story detailed the assault trial of a member of the organization "Up Against the
[Vol. XVII
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College athletes are legally distinguishable from their nonathletic
peers. 2 1 As Justice Scalia explains, "going out for the team" voluntarily sub-
jects one to far more regulations than a traditional student.22 In the college
setting, coming of age and breaking free from parental control may mean
very little in the heavily regulated athletic arena. 23 "Somewhat like adults
who choose to participate in a 'closely regulated industry,' students who vol-
untarily participate in school athletics have reason to expect intrusions upon
normal rights and privileges, including privacy."24 Student-athletes are often
deprived of an ordinary college experience because they are subject to exten-
sive regulations, including: dress codes,25 curfews, mandatory class attend-
ance, 26 study hall obligations, and compulsory abstinence from tobacco and
alcohol.27 Speech, and the many restrictions placed on an athlete's speech, is
yet another area where schools regulate college athletes differently from their
contemporaries.2 8 But for every regulation, there appears to be a counter-
Wall Mother Fucker," and the story printed a political cartoon of a police of-
ficer raping the Statute of Liberty and Lady Justice).
21. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995).
22. Id. at 657.
23. See, e.g., Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 658 (Cal. 1994) ("[Stu-
dent-athletes are subject to] special regulation of sleep habits, diet, fitness, and
other activities that intrude significantly on privacy interests ... not shared by
other students or the population at large.").
24. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 657.
25. See, e.g., UNIV. OF S. C., SOUTH CAROLINA STUDENT-ATHLETE CODE OF CON-
DUCT HANDBOOK 502M:1, available at http://netitor.com/photos/schools/scar/
genrel/auto-pdf/Policy5.pdf (When traveling, male members of the South Car-
olina athletic program are to "refrain from wearing earrings" and female ath-
letes are expected to "wear a dress, skirt, or dress slacks." The university
justifies these restrictions because the student-athletes represent the school both
on and off the field).
26. See, e.g., VA. DEP'T OF ATHLETICS, VIRGINIA TECH STUDENT-ATHLETE HAND-
BOOK 7 (2014-2015 ed. 2014), available at http://www.hokiesports.com/sa
handbook/sahandbook.pdf ("A textbook or good tutor is no substitute for at-
tending class. Class absences are reported to your coach SAASS Advisor and
may impact on your playing time or, ultimately, your athletic eligibility.").
27. See, e.g., UNIV. OF DEL., UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE STUDENT-ATHLETE HAND-
BOOK 13 (2011-2012 ed. 2011), available at http://www.udel.edu/ssa/Misc%20
Documents/Handbook/StudentAthleteHandbook%2011-12%20FINAL.pdf
(proscribing that the university will not tolerate underage consumption of alco-
hol or tobacco use).
28. See CLEMSON UNIV. ATHLETIC DEP'T, CLEMSON UNIVERSITY ATHLETIC DE-
PARTMENT STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK 38 (2013-2014 ed. 2013) [hereinaf-
ter CLEMSON STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK], available at http://www.nmn
athletics.com/fls/28500/pdf/athletics/2013-14/201314_sahandbook.pdf?DBO
EM ID=28500.
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balancing perk. For example, at Clemson University, student-athletes are
given priority in registration "so that student-athletes can arrange class
schedules to accommodate their academic goals and athletic responsibili-
ties."29 This special registration is a benefit provided solely to athletes. But,
with benefits comes obligations.
As this article explains, college athletes are not truly free to express
themselves. Strict conference rules regarding sportsmanship,30 team rules and
regulations,31 and penalties for "excessive celebration"32 stop the lofty no-
tions of free speech and expression right behind the college athlete's bench.33
Fans taunt and curse players to get inside their heads, but NCAA sportsman-
ship regulations prohibit student-athletes from using obscene gestures or vul-
gar language in response.34 In fact, some NCAA conferences require student-
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., METRO ATL. ATHLETIC CONFERENCE, STUDENT-ATHLETE SPORTS-
MANSHIP STATEMENT 1 (2013-2014 ed. 2013) [hereinafter MAAC SPORTSMAN-
SHIP STATEMENT], available at http://www.maacsports.com/fls/17400/pdf/MA
AC%20Sportsmanship%2OBylaws.pdf?DBOEMID=17400 (follow "Stu-
dent-Athlete Sportsmanship Statement" hyperlink) ("significant penalties will
be applied for fighting, taunting an opponent, or for any other unethical
conduct").
31. See, e.g., FLA. STATE UNIV. DEP'T OF ATHLETICS, SEMINOLE HANDBOOK &
PLANNER 2014-2015 168 (2014-2015 ed. 2014) [hereinafter FLORIDA STATE
SEMINOLE HANDBOOK], available at http://www.seminoles.com/fls/32900/pdf/
student-services-handbook-] 415.pdf ("inappropriate activity or language in vi-
olation of [this policy], including first time offenses, is subject to investigation
and possible sanction by FSU ... and/or the Athletics Department, [including]
[i]ndefinite suspension [or] [d]ismissal from the team [and] [n]on-renewal of
[the student's] athletic grant-in-aid").
32. See UNIV. OF Wyo. Div. OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, UNIVERSITY OF WY-
OMING STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK 39 (rev. ed. 2014) [hereinafter Wyo-
MING STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK], available at http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/
schools/wyo/sports/academics/auto-pdf/2014-15/miscnonevent/sa-handbook
-14.pdf ("[proscribing] taunting, trash-talking, profane/vulgar language, inap-
propriate 'celebrations' or a disrespectful attitude toward our opponents or
officials").
33. See FLORIDA STATE SEMINOLE HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at 168 ("Student-
athletes are highly visible representatives of the university and are expected to
uphold the values and responsibilities of the University while meeting all re-
quirements set forth by the ACC, the NCAA, FSU, and the FSU intercollegiate
athletics program.").
34. See, e.g., THE DEP'T OF ATHLETICS AT COLO. STATE, 2012-13 COLORADO
STATE STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK 27 (2012-2013 ed. 2012) [hereinafter
COLORADO STATE STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK], available at http://
grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/csu/genrel/auto-pdf/2013-14/miscnonevent/
student-handbook.pdf (Colorado State's explanation of the "Mountain West
Statement on Sportsmanship" is illustrative of other national conferences. Col-
[Vol. XVII
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athletes to sign sportsmanship agreements. 35 These agreements affirm that
although "victory shall be the expected goal of every competitor, defeat is
not a disgrace; the prospect of defeat is never an excuse for unethical behav-
ior or a lack of sportsmanship."36
The NCAA, individual conferences, and coaches regularly reprimand or
suspend student-athletes for unsportsmanlike behavior. For example, Saint
Joseph's suspended junior basketball player Halil Kanacevic for two games
after "[h]e made an obscene gesture."37 Moreover, the NCAA reprimanded
Marshall Henderson, a Mississippi basketball player, for "extend[ing] both
middle fingers to the crowd as he left the court" following a loss. 3 8 Similarly,
the Big Ten reprimanded Marcus Hall, an Ohio State football player, for
making an obscene gesture directed at opposing fans while exiting a football
game.39 All three athletes were penalized for exercising their "right" to self-
expression through a universal signal: the middle-finger.40 The understood
orado State explains that publically criticizing or disparaging and using ob-
scene gestures or unduly provocative language or action toward game officials,
the Conference or its personnel, another institution, or a student-athlete or per-
sonnel of another institution violate the Sportsmanship Policy.).
35. See, e.g., MAAC SPORTSMANSHIP STATEMENT, supra note 30, 5 ("This form
must be signed by all student-athletes who are participating on an intercollegi-
ate team at a MAAC member school.").
36. Id. 3.
37. Saint Joe's Suspends Halil Kanacevic, ESPN.coM, http://espn.go.com/mens-
college-basketball/story//id/8741752/saint-joseph-hawks-suspend-halil-kanace
vic-two-games (last updated Dec. 12, 2012, 8:30 PM) (Kanacevic was also
prohibited from participating in team activities for one week.).
38. Marshall Henderson Reprimanded, ESPN.coM, http://espn.go.com/mens-col
lege-basketball/story/_/id/9425494marshall-henderson-mississippi-rebels-repri
manded-gesture?src=mobile (last updated June 26, 2013, 6:21 PM) ("The
NCAA issued the reprimand Wednesday, saying Henderson's actions failed to
represent the 'highest standards of sportsmanship.').
39. Big Ten Reprimands Ohio State's Marcus Hall for Flipping Off Fans, USA
TODAY SPORTS (Dec. 2, 2013, 8:24 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/ncaaf/2013/ 12/02/marcus-hall-ohio-state-reprimanded-for-flipping-off-
michigan-fans/3817669 ("Hall raised both hands high and flipped off the Mich-
igan fans").
40. Id.; see Marshall Henderson Reprimanded, supra note 38 and accompanying
text; Scott M. Gleeson, St. Joe's Player Kanacevic Suspended for Middle Fin-
ger, USA TODAY SPORTS (Dec. 12, 2012, 7:30 PM), http://www.usatoday.
com/story/sports/ncaab/2012/12/12/st-joes-forward-halil-kanacevic-gives-
crowd-middle-finger-misses-key-free-throws-in-loss-to-villanova/1764061
(clarifying that Kanacevic "flashed the middle finger" towards the crowd).
2014]
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and intended message was clear: "fuck you."41 Each of the three athletes
received some form of punishment or reprimand and each issued an official
apology.42
If college athletes possessed the robust First Amendment rights of their
more traditional classmates, their symbolic gestures would receive full pro-
tection.43 In fact, Marshall Henderson simply responded in kind to the ob-
scenities of spectators in the student section. 44 How common is it when
walking around a college campus to happen upon the ubiquitous hand gesture
or the F-bomb? Is the "F word," as it is often termed, somehow more egre-
gious than other derogatory words or gestures?45 The Supreme Court fa-
mously queried: "How is one to distinguish this [word or gesture] from any
other offensive word [or gesture]? Surely the State has no right to cleanse
public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the most
squeamish among us."46
The F-word is given vigorous First Amendment protection outside of
athletics, even in the college setting.47 We hear it in music48 movies,49 and
41. See generally Christopher M. Fairman, Fuck, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1711,
1719-20, 1727-28 (2006) (explaining that the word "fuck" has both sexual and
nonsexual connotations).
42. See Saint Joe's Suspends Halil Kanacevic, supra note 37 (noting that
Kanacevic apologized later); Marshall Henderson Writes Apology, ESPN.coM,
http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_id/9131763/marshall-hen
derson-ole-miss-rebels-writes-apology-letter (last updated Apr. 3, 2013, 9:57
PM) (explaining that Henderson posted an apology letter on the Ole' Miss web-
site following a season-ending loss to LaSalle in the NCAA tournament); Big
Ten Reprimands Ohio State's Marcus Hall for Flipping Off Fans, supra note
39 ("Hall apologized after the incident on his Twitter account").
43. See, e.g., Papish v. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 667, 668,
671 (1973) (per curiam) (providing First Amendment protection against college
disciplinary action for use of the term "Mother Fucker" in a journalism story).
44. See Huffington Post, Marshall Henderson Middle Finger Exit: Ole Miss Star
Flips Off Crowd After Loss to La Salle, HUFFPOST SPORTS (Mar. 26, 2013,
4:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/26/marshall-henderson-fin
ger-flips-off-ole-miss-la-salle n_2956913.html (noting that Henderson was
purportedly taunted by people in the stands).
45. See Fairman, supra note 41, at 1721-30 (exploring the "dichotomy over 'our
worst word'" based on its taboo nature).
46. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
47. See Papish, 410 U.S. at 670 ("Healy makes it clear that the mere dissemination
of ideas-no matter how offensive to good taste-on a state university campus
[sic] may not be shut off in the name alone of 'conventions of decency'")
(citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972)).
48. See, e.g., PINK, Fuckin' Perfect, on GREATEST HITS. . . So FAR!!! (LaFace
Records & RCA Records 2010).
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see it in political protests.50 From Paul Cohen's jacket to Pink's popular song,
resort to the F-word, once seen as taboo, is becoming increasingly common. 5'
When nineteen-year-old Paul Cohen wore the phrase "Fuck the Draft" in a
California municipal courthouse,52 the Supreme Court upheld the phrase as
protected speech.53 In this renown case, Justice Harlan reiterated that "while
the particular four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful
than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man's
vulgarity is another's lyric."54 Today, the middle-finger and the "four-letter"
word this gesture represents are quite ordinary, particularly among college-
aged individuals. Since Cohen, the "F-word" has seemingly lost much of its
potency, except when it comes to athletes.55 While permitting Americans to
utter, scream, sing, or gesture "fuck" underscores our free society and illus-
trates free expression,56 coaches, conferences, and the NCAA believe this
word, and gesture, has no place in the realm of college athletics.
The NCAA, state universities, and college coaches exercise the very
right withheld from the states-the right to "cleanse public debate" on the
sporting fields of college campuses.57 This "cleansing" is regularly explained
either in terms of "sportsmanship" or packaged under the "privilege" of par-
ticipating in intercollegiate sports.58 In fairness, states often have greater reg-
49. See, e.g., THE WOLF OF WALL STREET (Paramount Pictures 2013); see also
Eliana Dockterman, The Wolf of Wall Street Breaks F-Bomb Record, TIME
ENTM'T (Jan. 3, 2014), http://entertainment.time.comf2014/0l/03/the-wolf-of-
wall-street-breaks-f-bomb-record (discussing that Martin Scorsese's film pur-
portedly used the F-word 2.81 times per minute, with over 500 "F-bombs"
being used during the course of the film).
50. See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16 ("[Cohen wore] the jacket as a means of in-
forming the public of the depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War and the
draft"); see also Alan E. Garfield, To Swear or Not to Swear: Using Foul Lan-
guage During a Supreme Court Oral Argument, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 279, 279
(2012) (noting that Cohen's "Fuck the Draft" jacket brought the F-word to the
highest court in the land for the first time).
51. See PINK, supra note 48; Cohen, supra note 50, at 16 and accompanying text.
52. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16 (underscoring the fact that women and children saw
the phrase).
53. Id. at 26.
54. Id. at 25.
55. But see Garfield, supra note 50, at 279-80, 282, 286-87 (noting that only one
individual has ever dared utter the F-word while appearing before the Supreme
Court: Paul Cohen's attorney, Professor Melville Nimmer).
56. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.
57. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972) ("[Sltate colleges and uni-
versities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment.").
58. See, e.g., CLEMSON STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 8
("[p]articipation in athletics is a privilege that carries a tremendous amount of
2014]
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ulatory powers when acting in an educational capacity, so flipping off a
teacher while leaving class might also secure an official reprimand.59 But, the
NCAA, conferences, and coaches go much further in regulating what they
believe to be unacceptable speech. Nearly every NCAA institution has a sep-
arate student-athlete code of conduct that supplements, not supplants, the
more generic student codes of conduct governing the college experience.60
For example, Virginia Tech reminds its student-athletes that:
You have been admitted as a student into the academic programs
at Virginia Tech. In addition, you are on an intercollegiate sports
roster. It is a privilege, and not a right, to participate in intercolle-
giate athletics. As a student who participates in intercollegiate ath-
letics, you become a member of a team. When you accept the
privileges of being a Virginia Tech athletic member, you also ac-
cept the responsibilities of representing the university as a
student.61
Additionally, student-athletes are regularly prohibited from using "profane
language" or "vulgar gestures."62 Most people-outside of their childhood
homes-are probably not subject to such limitations on their language or
gestures.
responsibility for the student-athlete [and] [a]s Clemson University's most visi-
ble ambassadors, student-athletes are expected to uphold high standards of in-
tegrity and behavior that will reflect well upon them, their families, coaches,
teammates, the Athletic Department, and Clemson University").
59. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (hold-
ing that the "School District acted entirely within its permissible authority in
imposing sanctions upon [respondent] in response to his offensively lewd and
indecent speech"). But see Papish v. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S.
667, 668-71 (1973) (per curiam) (tolerating the use of the phrase "Mother
Fucker" in the college setting despite a school policy prohibiting indecent con-
duct or speech).
60. See, e.g., VIRGINIA TECH STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 2
(setting forth the student-athlete's various responsibilities).
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., IND. UNIv. ATHLETICS, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON THE CONDUCT
OF PARTICIPANTS IN STUDENT ATHLETIC PROGRAMS § 2.1 (rev. ed. 2014) [here-
inafter INDIANA UNIV. ATHLETICS STATEMENT], available at http://www.iuhoos
iers.com/compliance/ind-compliance-conduct.html (stating further that student-
athletes are prohibited "from demeaning or belittling another person"); THE
UNIV. OF TEX. INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, 2014-2015 STUDENT-ATHLETE
MANUAL 8 (2014-2015 ed. 2014) [hereinafter UNIV. OF TEXAS STUDENT-ATH-
LETE MANUAL], available at http://texassports-com.s3.amazonaws.comdocu
ments/2014/8/17/2014_15_UTexasSAManual.pdf?id=3478 ("[p]rofanity and
any other form of negative or inappropriate behavior and communication [are
prohibited] .... [T]reat teammates, opponents, coaches, officials, and specta-
tors with respect and courtesy").
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The proscription against cursing or using offensive language is only the
tip of expressive regulations imposed on student-athletes. Unlike traditional
college students, student-athletes are given strict dress codes,63 subjected to
random drug testing,64 and required to attend all classes65 and study hall ses-
63. Compare LSU DEP'T OF ATHLETICS, LSU STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK
2014-2015, at 6 (2014-2015 ed. 2014) [hereinafter LSU STUDENT-ATHLETE
HANDBOOK], available at http://students.lsu.edu/saa/code 10-2 (explaining to
student-athletes that "[y]our head coach will let you know if he/she requires a
specific dress code .... [you] should always exercise good judgment concern-
ing the appropriateness of your attire"), and WYOMING STUDENT-ATHLETE
HANDBOOK, supra note 32, at 128-29 (imposing a strict dress code during
practices and workouts by giving athletes only five color choices and explicitly
prohibiting the color green and clothing that either "supports other NCAA uni-
versities" or "contains profanity or degrading commentary/graphicsthat sup-
ports other universities, or that has profanity), with LA. STATE UNIV. & AGRIC.
& MECH. COLL., LSU CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT § 10.2 (rev. ed. 2014),
available at http://saa.lsu.edu/sites/saa.lsu.edu/files/attachments/LSU%20Code
%20of%20Student%20Conduct%20jan_14.pdf (deeming that nudity is offen-
sive behavior and misconduct, but containing no other dress code require-
ments), and UNIV. OF Wyo., 2014-2015 STUDENT CODE OF CONDUCT 6-9
(2014-2015 ed. 2014), available at http://www.uwyo.edu/dos/_files/docs/2014
-2015%20code%20of%2oconduct.pdf (containing no dress code requirements).
64. Compare OHIO STATE ATHLETICS, STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK 14 (2009)
[hereinafter OHIO STATE STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK], available at http://
grfx.cstv.com/schools/osu/graphics/pdf/handbook/Student-Athlete-Handbook.
pdf (requiring consent and participation in the athletic department's mandatory
drug test), with OHIO STATE UNIV., CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT 6 (2012),
available at http://studentaffairs.osu.edu/csc/ (prohibiting the "[u]se, produc-
tion, distribution, sale, or possession of drugs," but no drug test requirement).
65. Compare THE UNIV. OF ARIZ. DEP'T OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, STU-
DENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK 34 (rev. ed. 2011) [hereinafter UNIV. OF ARIZONA
STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK], available at http://azregents.asu.edu/rrc/Pol
icy%20Manual/5-308-Student%2OCode%20of%20Conduct.pdf (explaining
that, except for travel, illness, or family emergencies, student-athletes are re-
quired to attend "scheduled classes," and tardiness to class will count as one-
half an absence), N.M. STATE UNIV. AGGIE ATHLETICS, 2014-15 NM STATE
STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK 12 (2014-15 ed. 2014), available at http://
www.nmstatesports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DBOEMID= 1900&ATCLID=
204894176 ("[Student-athletes must] attend every class meeting, complete all
assignments and exhibit appropriate behavior in class .... [and] be on time for
every class and remain in class for the duration of the class period"), and COLO-
RADO STATE STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at 26 (stating that
"[s]tudent-athletes are expected to attend all classes except for absences due to
competition, and/or illness/emergencies"), with UNIV. OF ARIZ., 5-308 STU-
DENT CODE OF CONDUCT (rev. 2014), available at http://azregents.asu.edu/rrc/
Policy%20Manual/5-308-Student%2OCode%20of%20Conduct.pdf (containing
no attendance requirements), NEW MEXICO STATE UNIV., STUDENT CODE OF
CONDUCT II.B. (2011), available at http://deanofstudents.nmsu.edu/student-
2014]
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
sions.66 Additionally, student-athletes are prohibited from using tobacco or
alcohol and, increasingly, subjected to stringent social media policies.67 For
example, Utah State's Athletic Department prohibits student-athletes from
posting any images of "inappropriate behavior," including the display of fire-
arms. 68 This prohibition impacts the student-athlete's First and Second
Amendment rights.69 But, before addressing these stringent social media pol-
icies and their constitutionality, the basic restrictions on student-athletes'
handbook/] -student-code-of-conduct/3-academic-misconduct.html (containing
no attendance requirements, but prohibiting disruptive class room behavior),
and COLO. STATE UNIV., COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY STUDENT CODE OF
CONDUCT (2012), available at http://www.conflictresolution.colostate.edu/
Data/S ites/ I /student-conduct-code/student-conduct-code-updated-07.15.2014.
pdf (containing no attendance requirements).
66. See, e.g., UNIV. OF N.M. ATHLETIC DEP'T, STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK 18
(2014) [hereinafter NEW MEXICO STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK], available at
http://www.golobos.com/pdf9/2766497.pdf?DB-OEMID=26000 (establish-
ing requirements for mandatory study hall).
67. See, e.g., id. at 40-41, 48; TEX. TECH UNIV. ATHLETIC DEP'T, TTU STUDENT-
ATHLETE SOCIAL NETWORKING POLICY [hereinafter TEXAS TECH SOCIAL
NETWORKING POLICY], available at https://www.documentcloud.org/docu-
ments/1087507-texas-tech-policy.html#document/p2 /a150066 (requiring stu-
dent-athletes to provide their signature, which "shows that [they] accept any
disciplinary action" for abusing the guidelines); see also Rex Santus, Colleges
Monitor, Restrict Athletes on Social Media, STUDENT LAW REVIEW CTR. (Mar.
26, 2014), http://ajr.org/2014/03/26/social-media-monitoring-widespread-
among-college-athletic-departments (providing documents that were requested
and shared by the Philip Merrill College of Journalism at the University of
Maryland from "athletic departments nationwide," including Texas Tech Uni-
versity's social networking policy for student-athletes).
68. UTAH STATE UNIV., UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY 2013-2014 STUDENT-ATHLETE
HANDBOOK 38 [hereinafter UTAH STATE POLICY], available at http://grfx.
cstv.com/photos/schools/ust/genrel/auto-pdf/2013-14/miscnonevent/S-A
Handbookl3-14draft2.pdf ("Generally [student athletes cannot use social
networking cites that] contain images that are damaging to the individual or
Utah State's reputation."). See also former TEXAS TECH SOCIAL NETWORKING
POLICY, which previously prohibited the display of firearms (compared to other
NCAA schools, this restriction is more ironic and peculiar because the Texas
Tech mascot is the Red Raider, who holds "guns in the air." Essentially, the
policy prohibits student-athletes from posting pictures of the team mascot, pic-
tures of student-athletes showing the student hand sign of "guns in the air," or
any other Red raider picture running afoul of this curious proscription.) (on file
with author).
69. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (freedom of speech and fight to assemble); U.S.
CONST. amend. II ("the right of the people to keep and bear Arms").
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speech and expression deserve more attention.70 Advocates for full social
media rights that rely on the purported free speech rights of student-athletes
fail to acknowledge the oppressive restrictions currently in place.7l Under
existing student-athlete conduct regulations, would limiting any particular
method of communication via social media really alter the status quo?72 To
illustrate, Montana State University (MSU) reminds its student-athletes that:
It is a privilege and not a right to be a student-athlete at MSU. On
and off campus and in cyberspace communities, every student ath-
lete is expected to conduct himself or herself in a manner that
exhibits honor and respect to a team, department, University and
surrounding community for a duration of his or her tenure as a
student-athlete.73
However, if MSU wants to regulate behavior both "[o]n and off campus,"
then what does adding "cyberspace" really accomplish?74 Does MSU's
"Cyberspace" prohibition provide additional clarification?75 More impor-
tantly, if coaches can generically restrict speech and expression at the granu-
lar level, then how does regulating the use of social media alter the equation?
Consider "trash" talk, for example. Trash talk violates conference
"sportsmanship" policies, which may result in sanctions. Two notable exam-
70. See, e.g., NEW MEXICO STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK, supra note 66, at 32
(advising student-athletes that they may not text or talk during class).
71. See, e.g., ARIZ. STATE UNIV. INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC DEP'T, STUDENT-
ATHLETE CODE OF CONDUCT POLICY I [hereinafter ARIZONA STATE STUDENT-
ATHLETE CODE OF CONDUCT], available at http://www.asu.edu/aad/manuals/
policyarchives/ICA/Nov2007/ica40la.pdf ("[P]olicy covers behavior both on
and off-campus [and punishment for violations] may include loss of scholar-
ships, as well as restrictions in practice or competition.").
72. See WYOMING STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK, supra note 32, at 32 ("[A]s a
UW student-athlete, you are expected to behave both on-and-off campus in a
manner which brings credit to the University and your team, [which] includes,
but is not limited to, your behavior/actions while utilizing social networks (e.g.,
Facebook, Twitter, blogs, etc.)").
73. MONT. STATE UNIV. - BOZEMAN, STUDENT-ATHLETE CODE OF CONDUCT 1-4
[hereinafter MSU STUDENT-ATHLETE CODE OF CONDUCT], available at http://
www.montana.edu/policy/studentconduct/ (requiring student-athletes to initial
each Section and sign the last page).
74. See id. at 1.
75. See id. at 2 ("Cyberspace ([i]ncluding social networking websites): Student-
athletes are permitted to have profiles on social networking websites such as
Myspace and Facebook, [but cannot post]offensive or inappropriate pictures
[or] comments [and] any information placed on the website(s) [cannot] violate
the ethics and intent behind the MSU Student Code of Conduct, the student-
athlete code of conduct, and all other applicable state, federal, and local
laws.").
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pies involve conference sanctions against football players for both figurative
and literal trash talk. The Pac-12 reprimanded Matt Barkley, the highly-re-
garded University of Southern California quarterback, for referring to an Ari-
zona State University opponent as a "dirty player."76 In imposing an official
reprimand, the Pac-12 Commissioner explained that all of its student-athletes
"must adhere to the Pac-12's policies on sportsmanship and standards of con-
duct, which call for our student-athletes to treat opponents with respect and
create and ensure a collegiate atmosphere in which to conduct competition.
In these circumstances, Mr. Barkley's comments were a clear violation of
conference rules ....
The Big 12 followed suit by officially reprimanding Texas Longhorn
linebacker Steve Edmond for calling Baylor "trash" after Baylor won the
conference championship.78 The Big 12 Commissioner defended the repri-
mand, explaining, "Mr. Edmond violated the Conference rule that prohibit[s]
coaches, student-athletes, athletic department staff and university personnel
from making negative public comments about other member institutions.
Consistent with our standard for such violations he is being issued a public
reprimand."79 It should shock readers to learn that universities and athletic
conferences can reprimand and potentially suspend a college athlete for re-
marking that another athlete is a "dirty player"80 or that another team is
"trash."81
Instead of decrying the social media restrictions, society should focus on
far more intrusive First Amendment sacrifices student-athletes make.82 The
76. Pedro Moura, Pac-12 Reprimands Matt Barkley, ESPN.coM (Sept. 27, 2011,
10:52 PM), http://espn.go.com/los-angeles/ncf/story/ /id/7028640/pac-12-repri
mands-usc-trojans-matt-barkley-comments.
77. Id. Of note, Arizona State actually defeated USC 43-22 following Barkley's
comments.
78. See Tom Fomelli, Big 12 Reprimands Texas' Steve Edmond for Baylor Trash
Talk, CBSSPORTS.COM (Apr. 25, 2014, 4:30 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/
collegefootball/eye-on-college-football/2453923 1/big- 12-reprimands-texas-
steve-edmond-for-baylor-trash-talk.
79. Id.
80. Moura, supra note 76.
81. Fomelli, supra note 78.
82. See, e.g., UNIV. OF ARiz. DEP'T OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, STUDENT-
ATHLETE HANDBOOK 98-99 (2011) [hereinafter ARIZONA STUDENT-ATHLETE
HANDBOOK], available at http://athletics.arizona.edu/cats/2011-12_Student
Handbook.pdf ("It is expected that you will not post any pictures or other con-
tent that might cause embarrassment to you, your team or The University of
Arizona (e.g., obscene language, pictures at parties with alcohol, references to
drugs or sex, weapons, etc.)"); UTAH STATE POLICY, supra note 68 ("Generally
[student athletes cannot use social networking cites that] contain images that
are damaging to the individual or Utah State's reputation.").
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First Amendment not only protects against laws "abridging the freedom of
speech,"83 but also protects against legal consequences or criminal prosecu-
tions for exercising the right to speak.84 If public universities can legally
require student-athletes to treat opponents with "dignity and respect" and to
"avoid conduct that demeans [or] harasses" any person, such as prohibitions
against "using excessive profane language or vulgar gestures," then these
universities have seriously curtailed the free speech rights of student-ath-
letes.85 Further, if schools can prevent student-athletes from posting certain
items on their social media accounts, such as "offensive or foul language"86
or displays of firearms or weapons, 87 what speech rights truly exist for these
individuals?88
Before tackling the larger First Amendment issues related to social me-
dia usage, scholars and student-athlete advocates should attack the far more
pervasive speech and expression rights curtailed under governing student-
athlete codes of conduct and conference rules. The question regarding stu-
dent-athletes' rights to free expression raises far more complex issues than
social media advocates admit or nonathletes comprehend.8 9
IIl. REGULATING ATHLETES 1N 140 CHARACTERS OR LESS
Student-athletes should understand that participating in athletics
at The Ohio State University is a privilege and not a right. There-
83. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
84. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217 (2011) (holding offensive signs by
Westboro Baptist Church were protected speech); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 420 (1989) (holding that burning the American flag was "expressive con-
duct" protected under the First Amendment); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
26 (1971) (holding that wearing a jacket with "Fuck the Draft" on it is not a
criminal offense).
85. INDIANA UNIV. ATHLETICS STATEMENT, supra note 62.
86. See, e.g., UTAH STATE POLICY, supra note 68.
87. See, e.g., ARIZONA STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK, supra note 82.
88. At least two state universities, including Texas Tech University and Utah State
University, have required their student-athletes to refrain from posting any dis-
play of firearms on their social networking sites. TEXAS TECH SOCIAL
NETWORKING POLICY, supra note 67; UTAH STATE POLICY, supra note 68. This
requirement implicates not only the student-athlete's First Amendment rights to
freedom of speech and expression, but also potentially the athlete's Second
Amendment rights as well. Texas Tech and Utah State do not require
nonathlete students to make such sacrifices on their personal social media sites.
89. See Richard v. Perkins, 373 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1217 (D. Kan. 2005) (finding no
First Amendment violation following track athlete's dismissal from the team).
The Court further noted that student-athletes do not possess "constitutionally
protected property or liberty interests in participating in intercollegiate athlet-
ics." Id. at 1219.
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fore, student-athletes have no right to expect privacy in what they
post on social media.90
Most NCAA institutions have separate social media policies designed
specifically for athletes, in addition to separate student-athlete codes of con-
duct.9' Many of these social media policies, much like the student-athlete
codes of conduct, begin by reminding student-athletes that playing and com-
peting for the university is a "privilege, not a right."92 These policies, such as
the University of Nebraska's, frequently point out that the public sees the
student-athletes as "role models in the community."93 The University of Ne-
braska also cautions that "[a]s leaders we have the responsibility to portray
our team, our University and ourselves in a positive manner at all times.
Sometimes this means doing things that are of an inconvenience to us, but
benefit the whole team."94
Many public universities generically prohibit negative or offensive so-
cial media content that would seem constitutionally suspect if a school were
90. OHIO STATE UNIV., OSU STUDENT-ATHLETE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT AND
SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY 3 [hereinafter OSU POLICY], available at http://s3.docu
mentcloud.org/documents/ I 087505/ohio-state-policy.pdf (requiring student-
athlete signature).
91. See, e.g., Univ. of Mich., Social Media Guidelines, MGOBLUE.COM, http://
www.mgoblue.com/compliance/sa-social-media.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015)
("Along with [student-athlete privileges come] expectations and responsibili-
ties as a Michigan student-athlete [and students-athletes] are held to a higher
standard and are recognized both locally and nationally because you choose to
represent this University and your respective sport."); UNIV. OF N.M., UNIVER-
SITY OF NEW MEXICO SOCIAL NETWORKING POLICY FOR STUDENT-ATHLETES
33 [hereinafter NEW MEXICO POLICY], available at http://www.golobos.com/
fls/260001pdf/fff.pdf?DBOEMID=26000 (reminding student-athletes that
they have a responsibility to positively portray the team and University at all
times.).
92. E.g., N.C. STATE UNIV., NC STATE STUDENT-ATHLETE GUIDELINES FOR THE
USE OF SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES 1 (2010) [hereinafter NC STATE GUIDE-
LINES], available at http://grfx.cstv.comlphotos/schools/ncst/sports/compliance/
autopdf/2011-12/miscnonevent/SocialNetworkingPolicy.pdf; NEW MEX-
ICO POLICY, supra note 91; UNIV. OF NEB., SOCIAL NETWORKING POLICY FOR
STUDENT-ATHLETES (2008) [hereinafter NEBRASKA POLICY], available at http:/
/www.huskers.comNiewArticle.dbml?DBOEMID= 100&ATCLID=36305
60; UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, POLICY ON STUDENT-ATHLETE SOCIAL
NETWORKING AND MEDIA USE 1 (2012) [hereinafter UNC POLICY], available
at http://www.goheels.com/fls/3350/pdf/Compliance/SocialNetworkingPolicy
.pdf?SPID=l 11196.
93. NEBRASKA POLICY, supra note 92.
94. Id.
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not permitted to restrict a student-athlete's social media usage. 95 For exam-
ple, the University of Nebraska informs its student-athletes that:
If a student-athlete's profile and its contents are found to be inap-
propriate in accordance with [the school's social media policy, in-
cluding using inappropriate or offensive language], he/she will be
subject to the following penalties: 1) written warning; 2) a meet-
ing with the Director of Athletics and Head Coach; 3) penalties as
determined by the athletics department, for example, suspension
from athletic team. 96
Ohio State similarly admonishes its student-athletes that "[y]ou shall not post
or contribute any content to any social networking or other internet site(s)
that reflects negatively (determined at the sole discretion of the University)
on yourself, your team and/or teammates, your coach(es) or the Department
of Athletics."97
Most, if not all, First Amendment scholars would disagree with a state,
city, or municipality passing an ordinance that bans social media postings
that negatively reflect on an individual or others, especially where those enti-
ties possesses the sole discretion to determine whether the posting appears
negative.98 While these policies do advise students, providing a warning that
95. See, e.g., COLO. STATE UNIV., 2012-13 COLORADO STATE STUDENT-ATHLETE
HANDBOOK, INTERNET ETHICS POLICY 22-23 (2012) [hereinafter COLORADO
STATE POLICY], available at http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/csu/genrel/
auto-pdf/2013-14/misc nonevent/student-handbook.pdf (empowering the
Athletic Department to temporarily or permanently suspend an athlete from the
team or take away athletics scholarship if student-athletes have "offensive" or
"inappropriate" materials posted on their social media sites); LA. STATE UNIV.,
LSU STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK 2014-2015 7 (2014), available at http://
compliance.lsu.edu/studentathletes/Documents/LSU%2OHandbook%2014-15.
pdf ("[i]nappropriate language, behavior or on-line postings may result in sus-
pension or dismissal from the LSU Athletics program."); Mo. STATE UNIV.,
SOCIAL NETWORKING & NEW MEDIA POLICY 22 (2013-2014), available at
http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/mosu/genrel/auto-pdf/2013-14/misc-non_
event/2013-14Student-AthleteHandbook.pdf (disallowing use of any "offensive
or foul language" that is embarrassing or could jeopardized the university's
reputation, including postings by others on the athlete's page); NEW MEXICO
POLICY, supra note 91 (proscribing postings or comments regarding personal
use of tobacco and alcohol); UTAH STATE POLICY, supra note 68 (preventing
athletes from posting any "display" of "firearms").
96. NEBRASKA POLICY, supra note 92, at 2.
97. OHIO STATE UNIV. DEP'T OF ATHLETICS STUDENT-ATHLETE STANDARDS OF
CONDUCT, STUDENT-ATHLETE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT 2 (2009-10) [herein-
after OHIO STATE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT], available at http://grfx.cstv.com/
photos/schools/osu/genrel/auto-pdf/2010-1I/misc non event/sa-handbook4.
pdf (emphasis added).
98. Id. (emphasis added).
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consequences may follow, they also chill student-athletes' abilities to act like
regular college students enjoying the full range of First Amendment rights.
North Carolina State's social networking guidelines embody precisely the
type of policy that would chill speech. The policy begins:
As a public institution of higher education, NC State University
supports and encourages its student-athletes' rights to freedom of
speech, expression and association, including the use of social net-
works. Nevertheless, as representatives of the university, student-
athletes are held to a higher standard and are role models. Playing
and competing for NC State is a privilege, not a right. In this con-
text, each student-athlete has the responsibility to portray him or
herself, the team, and NC State in a positive manner .... Student-
athletes will be held responsible for their actions.99
While referring to this policy as "expectations," the University retains the
power to impose "the loss of athletic privileges or other sanctions as appro-
priate, including the non-renewal or reduction in athletic grant-in-aid or dis-
missal from a team."100
The neighboring University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill
fares no better in proclaiming it "recognizes and supports its student-athletes'
rights to freedom of speech, expression, and association, including the use of
online social networks .... [H]owever, each student-athlete must remember
that playing and competing for The University of North Carolina is a privi-
lege, not a right."01 Notably, UNC requires and reserves the right to have "at
least one" coach, administrator, other staff member, or even an outside ven-
dor to have "access to, [to] regularly monitor[ ] the content of, and/or [to]
receiv[e] reports about team members' social networking sites and post-
ings."102 If a student-athlete violates the law, NCAA policies, or a litany of
University rules and regulations, the University can ask the student to re-
move the offending posting or photo, dismiss the athlete from the team, and/
or reduce, cancel, or non-renew the student's athletics grant-in-aid. 103
The Supreme Court generally disfavors content-based proscriptions.104
While the law has routinely deemed certain forms of speech as possessing
low intrinsic value and, therefore, undeserving of First Amendment protec-
99. NC STATE GUIDELINES, supra note 92, at 1.
100. Id. at 1-2.
101. UNC POLICY, supra note 92, at 1.
102. Id. at 2.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (Justice Scalia
explained that "[t]he First Amendment generally prevents government from
proscribing speech or even expressive conduct because of disapproval of the
ideas expressed. Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.").
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tion,105 the student-athlete speech codes target speech that is otherwise both
protected and, at times, celebrated.106 As one scholar recently inquired: what
about the rights of student-athletes to raise and discuss issues relating to un-
ionizing?107 Modern student-athlete litigation, such as the O'Bannon case,
may ultimately permit students to unionize or receive compensation for their
names, images and likenesses.08 The Supreme Court historically places great
value on political speech and speech that implicates important public is-
sues.109 And, yet such student-athlete commentary could place the institution
or athletic department in a negative light. Student-athlete speech codes that
proscribe large categories of speech based solely on content raise serious
questions as to their constitutionality. Such content-based prohibitions run
afoul of the First Amendment and are likely unconstitutional; however, that
is a topic for another day.10
105. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973) (finding that obscenity consti-
tutes low value, unprotected speech); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447-48 (1969) (finding that words creating imminent incitement to violence
qualify as low value, unprotected speech); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 264-65, 292 (1964) (holding libel and defamation are low value, unpro-
tected speech, though the standard of review necessary for recovery varies de-
pending on whether the individual is a public or private figure); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (holding "fighting words" consti-
tute low value, unprotected speech).
106. Even extraordinarily offensive speech receives robust First Amendment protec-
tion when the speaker is addressing matters of public concern. See Snyder v.
Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217 (2011) (noting that Westboro Baptist Church's
signs addressed societal issues and not merely private concerns). Thus, while
perhaps patently offensive, these signs receive full First Amendment protection
against content-based restrictions. Id. at 1220.
107. See Knapp v. Nw. Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 1996); see O'Bannon v.
Nat'l Collgate Athl. Ass'n, No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 445190, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 8, 2010). During the Marquette Law Sports Law Works in Progress,
Professor Dionne Koller expressed concerns about speech codes that prohibit
student-athletes from openly discussing matters of public concern relating to
student-athletes. Dionne Koller, Professor of Sports Law at University of Balti-
more, Address at Marquette Law Sports Law Works in Progress (on file with
author).
108. Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in O'Bannon v. National Col-
legiate Athletic Association: A Small Step Forward for College Athlete Rights,
and a Gateway for Far Grander Change, 72 WASH. LEE L. REv. 2319 (2014).
109. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1207 (distinguishing the content-based nature of the pro-
scriptions at issue thereby negating any claim of content-neutral time, place,
and manner regulations).
110. This author believes that the majority of current student-athlete speech codes
would fail First Amendment scrutiny because the vast majority of them are
content-based, thus invoking strict scrutiny review. Under strict scrutiny, a law
or regulation must respond to a "compelling state interest" and be "narrowly
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In embracing content-based proscriptions, most commentators fail to ap-
preciate the danger of giving universities sole discretion to punish a student
athlete's expression, usually after the fact, for a statement that causes a nega-
tive reaction. Under most student-athlete speech codes, the university has
sole discretion to determine what constitutes a negative reflection, yet pro-
vides no real advance warning to student-athletes. In effect, universities have
empowered themselves with the ability to restrict unwanted behavior and
discussion, like communications from student-athletes on the formation of
unions or the use of their names, images and likenesses. Therefore, universi-
ties could punish student-athletes for supporting the outcome in the
O'Bannon case over social media by determining-after the fact-that such
conduct negatively reflects upon the respective institutions. Fortunately, no
such incidents have occurred publicly. These content-based regulations pre-
sent facially problematic, if not constitutionally infirm, issues. Advance pro-
hibition in the form of a limited in-season social media ban, in some ways,
would give greater procedural rights and arguably far more substantive pro-
tection to student-athletes. Student-athletes could more easily avoid problems
with the university if they had more certainty about what the university
would perceive as "reflect[ing] negatively" on the university.I,
Rutgers University, another state institution, counsels that "[s]tudent-
athletes could face discipline, including loss of scholarship and even dismis-
sal from a team for inappropriate postings" on social media.,12 This admoni-
tion parallels the one issued by Montana State University-Bozeman,
indicating its student-athletes "are permitted to have profiles on social
networking sites . . .provided that a) no offensive or inappropriate pictures
are posted, [and] b) no offensive or inappropriate comments are
tailored" with "no less restrictive means" available to address the compelling
state interest. A college's only viable interest in regulating the content of an
athlete's speech (e.g., no cursing or use of the F-word)-as opposed to the
venue (e.g., all speech on social media)-would be reputational interests. Such
reputational interests would hardly be compelling under a valid strict scrutiny
assessment. While this article only uses generic speech codes to illustrate the
highly regulated nature of college athletics and does not otherwise evaluate
them, a future article should address these content-based regulations.
Ill. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) ("[First Amendment free-
doms] are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society.
The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions."); OHIO STATE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, supra note
97.
112. RUTGERS UNIV., 2014-2015 STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK & PLANNER 45
(2014), available at http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/rutu/genrel/auto-pdf/
2014-15/miscnonevent/sahb-2014-2015.pdf.
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posted ... ."113 However, neither offers any additional guidance or defini-
tional clarity to expound on precisely what qualifies as inappropriate, much
less offensive, social media postings. Certainly, the eighteen to twenty-three
year-old student athletes' definition of "inappropriate" or "offensive" could
vastly differ from that of a coach, athletic director or university
administrator.' 14
If student-athletes possessed full First Amendment rights in regards to
social media, courts would likely find the following regulations unconstitu-
tionally vague: Nebraska's "inappropriate or offensive language" proscrip-
tion, Ohio State's "reflect negatively" admonition, and, Rutgers' prohibition
on "inappropriate" social media postings.l15 Similarly, the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill restricts student-athletes from posting any
"disrespectful comments" or "derogatory or defamatory language."16 What
reasonable person could know, in advance, what exactly these state institu-
tions seek to proscribe as inappropriate or disrespectful? Under a facial chal-
lenge, courts will find an ordinance unconstitutionally vague when persons of
ordinary intellect must guess as to its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion.11t Just like beauty, speech is in the eye of the beholder. One man's
offensive comment is another's satire.118 Beyond the constitutional infirmity
for vagueness, a state regulation is likely unconstitutionally overbroad when
it envelops more speech than is necessary to address the state's interest in
limiting expression.' 19 These burgeoning social media policies appear to cre-
113. MSU STUDENT-ATHLETE CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 73 (requiring both the
student-athlete's initials following each Section and signature indicating agree-
ment/waiver at the end of the document).
114. See NAACP, 371 U.S. at 438 ("Precision of regulation must be the touchstone
in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms").
115. See, e.g., Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (The Grayned
Court describes an unconstitutionally vague ordinance) ("Vague laws offend
several important values. [W]e assume that man is free to steer between lawful
and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelli-
gence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.
Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws
must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law imper-
missibly delegates basic policy matters to policeman, judges and juries for res-
olution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant danger of arbitrary
and discriminatory application.").
116. NC STATE GUIDELINES, supra note 92.
117. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).
118. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (Justice Harlan exclaimed that
"one man's vulgarity is another's lyric").
119. See Bd. of Airport Comm'rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569,
574-75 (1987) (striking down resolution as unconstitutional because the reso-
lution created a virtual "First Amendment Free Zone"); Erznoznik v. City of
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ate, at least constitutionally, more problems than they solve as the language
used to curtail speech lacks both guidance and fair notice.120
Indiana University gives some advance warning that student-athletes'
"conduct . . . shall reflect the fact that by virtue of their participation in
student athletic programs sponsored by Indiana University, they are repre-
senting the University. As a result, participants are expected to exhibit a
higher standard of behavior."12 But, this warning still lacks adequate no-
tice.122 Similar formulas are found throughout existing policies, such as Ari-
zona's admonishment that:
As a student-athlete at the University of Arizona you are not only
representing yourself and your team, but the entire university and
community. Because of your higher profile on campus, it is im-
portant that you be concerned with what is being published on
social networking sites, such as Facebook and MySpace.123
These speech codes demonstrate the reality that much of a college ath-
lete's speech and expression is heavily regulated. Such regulations are well
established, predating social media, and often allow coaches to make rules
aimed at ensuring team unity, conformity and discipline. The strongest, and
most broad proscription uncovered is the former Texas Tech Student-Athlete
Social Networking Policy, which required the acknowledgement and signa-
ture of each athlete along with their Facebook, e-mail, Twitter, YouTube
Instagram, Google+, and G-mail account information.124 The student-ath-
lete's signature:
[S]hows the Texas Tech University Athletic Department that you,
as a student athlete and representative of Texas Tech University,
are willing to adhere to the TTU Social Networking Policy and to
take extreme caution when using any social networking Web site,
and also shows that you accept any disciplinary action if these
previous guidelines are abused.J25
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1975) (striking down law as unconstitu-
tionally overbroad).
120. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967)
("Where statutes have an overbroad sweep, just as where they are vague, 'the
hazard of loss or substantial impairment of those precious rights may be critical
.... Since those covered by the statute are bound to limit their behavior to that
which is unquestionably safe").
121. INDIANA UNIV. ATHLETICS STATEMENT, supra note 62.
122. See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
123. UNIV. OF ARIZONA STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK, supra note 65, at 98.
124. TEXAS TECH SOCIAL NETWORKING POLICY, supra note 67, at 2.
125. Id.
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When this rather draconian policy was in effect, it was hard to agree
with Texas Tech when it prefaced its social media policy with an assurance
that "Texas Tech University supports and encourages the individuals' right
of free speech."126 Texas Tech athletic department officials indicate they
have withdrawn the policy, but would not specify when or why.127 The for-
mer Texas Tech language is similar to other schools whose policies remain in
effect, such as Utah State.128 Utah State uses identical language from the
discarded Texas Tech policy with strong anti-posting rules, such as "no dis-
play of alcohol or firearms, no offensive or foul language ... does not con-
tain images that are damaging to the individual or Utah State's reputation,"
which seems to undermine any hollow assurances of "free speech."29 Free
speech permits controversial postings, with an appreciation that the market-
place of ideas is strengthened by more, not less, speech.130
Most authors proclaim that universities have the right to punish students
for their indiscriminate postings, finding fault only with wholesale bans of
social media sites. However, the reality is that First Amendment analysis
receives the highest form of scrutiny when a regulation is content-based,
such as Utah State's anti-firearms regulation.131 These anti-speech codes, and
the numerous variations of content-based prohibitions imposed upon student-
athletes at state schools, are far more offensive to the First Amendment than
limited in-season social media bans. Content based proscriptions are far more
likely to be struck down if challenged in court than a more limited time,
place and manner regulation, such as an in-season ban on certain (though not
all) forms of social media. To pass constitutional scrutiny, state action that
restricts speech based on the content of that speech (i.e. speech relating to
firearms) must pass the highest, most-searching level of constitutional re-
view-strict scrutiny.132 In contrast, content neutral restrictions, such as plac-
126. Id. at 3.
127. E-mail from Texas Tech Athletic Department representative, to author (Sept. 9,
2014, 5:08 CST) (on file with author) (This representative would not discuss
any facts regarding the retracted policy other than to decisively proclaim that
the policy is no longer valid.).
128. E-mail from Utah State Athletic representative, to author (Sept. 25, 2014, 1:49
CST) (on file with author) (Utah State Athletic Department representative indi-
cated that their student-athlete code relating to social media remains valid.).
129. UTAH STATE POLICY, supra note 68, at 38.
130. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) ("[t]he college classroom with
its surrounding environs is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas' . . . .").
131. See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (The
Supreme Court has explained that where an ordinance describes impermissible
conduct "not in terms of time, place and manner, but in terms of subject mat-
ter," such regulation is constitutionally suspect.).
132. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980); see also Metromedia, Inc.
v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512-20 (1981) (plurality).
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ing limits on student-athlete's use of Twitter during season (regardless of
content) must only pass the more moderate intermediate level of scrutiny.133
Courts often strike down laws challenged under strict scrutiny as unconstitu-
tional. Courts require that the law respond to a compelling state interest by
imposing a narrowly tailored regulation that employs the least' restrictive
means to further its interest. Narrowly tailored regulations are extraordinarily
precise and limit only as much speech as necessary-truly necessary, not
merely convenient-to meet the compelling state interest.134
Utah State's no display of firearms policy strikes at the very heart of
free speech. Student-athletes cannot post pictures of friends and family mem-
bers serving in our military or police forces. Student-athletes cannot post
pictures of hunting trips or outings at a shooting range, despite the fact that
both events are wholly legal in Utah and throughout the United States. But,
Utah State is not alone in banning displays or descriptions of firearms and
weapons; Arizona also limits this particular form of expression, as did Texas
Tech previously, which aimed at curtailing full and free expression.135 And,
what is the compelling state interest for banning such pictures? Do they ban
pictures of families, friends, or even political candidates for reputational and
image issues?
Many of these athlete-specific social media policies illustrate the hollow
proclamations of free speech rights possessed by student athletes. They also
remind student-athletes that poor decision making regarding social media can
result in the athlete losing his or her privilege to participate in intercollegiate
athletics. Speech tethered to content is not free speech. Content-based restric-
tions are constitutionally suspect and far more likely to violate the First
Amendment than in-season bans that give students a much clearer, more
transparent choice of sports or social media.136 Where is the outrage about
these pervasive and existing policies, rather than the few coaches and schools
133. See Mary M. Penrose, Tinkering With Success: College Athletes, Social Media
and the First Amendment, PACE L. REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2015) (manuscript
at 5) (Social Media Symposium).
134. Cf Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (explaining in a different First
Amendment context that "even though the governmental purpose be legitimate
and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.
The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic
means for achieving the same basic purpose.").
135. See UTAH STATE POLICY, supra note 68, at 38; UNIV. OF ARIZONA STUDENT-
ATHLETE HANDBOOK, supra note 65, at 98-99.
136. Cf NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) ("First Amendment freedoms
need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with
narrow specificity.").
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that impose season-long bans?137 At least coaches who ban social media dur-
ing season make clear their desire to focus on team and sport over social
media. This is better than the plethora of content-based codes prioritizing
reputational issues over speech. In contrast, the schools with seemingly sup-
portive policies lull their student-athletes into believing they have freedoms
while simultaneously offering stern admonishments that will keep students
wondering and cautious. This contingent free speech often yields a more dra-
conian result than policies that directly restrict social media usage during
limited periods.138 Unlike limited time, place and manner regulations, the
subtle pressures of vague, overbroad and content-based proscriptions strike at
the heart of the First Amendment. These content-based speech codes not only
quash speech, but also chill expression due to uncertainty and intentionally
unclear guidelines.
Arguably, these social media warnings and long list of prohibited com-
munications fail to provide college athletes with the full range of speech and
expression protections enjoyed by other college students. Each of these par-
ticular speech regulations imposed by athletic departments invite the ques-
tion: does the First Amendment apply fully in the athletic realm? Those who
focus solely on the student's right to access and use social media while par-
ticipating in college athletics miss the equally important, if not more vital,
constitutional protection against repercussions for exercising a constitutional
right to speak or express oneself. What do we make of an athlete's right to
discuss the name, likeness and image/rights to publicity or unionization is-
sues addressed in the O'Bannon and Knapp v. Northwestern decisions? How
did the former Texas Tech policy and the current policies of Utah State,
Arizona, Ohio State, Rutgers, Oklahoma State, Nebraska, and Florida State
all escape the assessment of authors writing in this area? Why has society not
fully vetted and analyzed these quid-pro-quo agreements that essentially re-
quire students to waive their First Amendment rights in exchange for partici-
pating in intercollegiate athletics? If these athletes truly have a First
Amendment right to use social media, then universities cannot cavalierly re-
voke or ambiguously restrict this right as most are doing. In short, regula-
tions threatening punishment if a student-athlete's post violates some unclear
and ill-defined norm of inappropriate and offensive behavior, or presents a
137. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960) ("Freedoms
such as these are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but
also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interference.").
138. Cf Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 601
(1967) ("The very intricacy of the plan and the uncertainty as to the scope of its
proscriptions make it a highly efficient in terrorem mechanism."). One can
only surmise that universities provide as much latitude as possible to ensure
there is a tool for obnoxious misbehavior that can be, conveniently, enveloped
in the Student-Athlete Codes of Conduct or Handbooks. The Social Media Pol-
icies simply add another layer of ill-defined proscriptions affording the univer-
sities far more protection than their student-athletes.
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negative reflection of the university, are inconsistent with the First
Amendment.
The question under First Amendment analysis is not one of mere access
but also one of consequences. Coach Mack Brown demonstrated his limited
understanding of the First Amendment when he spoke of how he recognized
and supported the First Amendment rights of his players to use social media
while simultaneously suspending an athlete who posted a racial comment on
Facebook.139 If a school supports robust First Amendment rights, it must also
tolerate those forms of speech that are not inherently unlawful, including
language many find ugly such as racial slurs, profanity and other offensive
phrases.140 However, if schools do limit the content of student-athletes'
speech on social media, what is the qualitative distinction between curtailing
speech by limiting social media usage during the season versus imposing
penalties after the fact? The limited social media bans carry protection and
certainty in limiting the communication by time, while the content-based pro-
scriptions are far more broad, elastic and unpredictable, creating an inherent
chilling effect on student-athlete expression.
There is an important distinction between these front-end regulations
and after-the-fact punishments. Limiting speech on the front end furthers the
goal of athletics by avoiding needless distractions and bolstering team
unity.141 State regulation of protected speech (such as a racial slur or offen-
sive comment) based on content must be justified by an important or compel-
ling governmental interest.142 Contrast the governmental interest of placing
in-season limitations on social media with the governmental interest of pe-
nalizing distasteful speech after the fact. The first serves the interest of al-
lowing athletes to focus on sport and team rather than creating potential
distractions. The second appears grounded in the impermissible interest of
139. THE FLAGSHIP, http://texas.247sports.com/Board/21/Contents/Mack-Brown-
Doubles-Down-24513631 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) ("But just like fans have a
first amendment right so, too, do players and coaches. A 17-18 year old kid
has just as much a right to express his opinion as do fans. Let's not forget
that."); Martin Hinton, Texas lineman Burnette Booted for Racist Obama
Facebook Rant, YAHOO (Nov. 6, 2008), http://sports.yahoo.com/ncaa/football/
blog/dr-saturday /post/Texas-lineman-Burnette-booted-for-racist-Obama-F?urn
=ncaaf, 120197.
140. See, e.g., NAACP, 371 U.S. at 444-45 ("For the Constitution protects expres-
sion and association without regard to the race, creed, or political or religious
affiliation of the members of the group which invokes its shield, or to the truth,
popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered."); Cf
Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 601.
141. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 192 (1972) ("Just as in the community at
large, reasonable regulations with respect to the time, the place, and the manner
in which student groups conduct their speech-related activities must be
respected").
142. United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
[Vol. XVII
College Athletes' Use of Social Media
reputational value. Unlike the state interest in protecting against negative re-
flections on the athletic department, many coaches impose in-season restric-
tions on social media to limit distractions and emphasize strong team
performance. 143 These latter interests seem far more important, perhaps even
compelling, than a university's concern about post-hoc reputational ramifica-
tions caused by careless social media postings. After all, the goal of athletics
is winning, not speech and expression.
IV. PLACING SPORT IN PERSPECTIVE: THE TRUE GOAL OF ATHLETICS
This Social Media Policy establishes guidelines for the use of so-
cial media accounts created by OSU student-athletes in order to
further the mission of the Department of Athletics-to foster a cul-
ture that provides the opportunity to develop student-athletes
through success in academics and competition to achieve excel-
lence in life. The University believes that posting negative com-
ments about teammates or coaches undermines that culture and
can have a very divisive effect on team chemistry .... 144
The goal of college athletics is simple: achieving the highest level of
athletic success while competing fairly and together as a unit.i45 Athletics
involve team, honor, commitment, sacrifice, physically rigorous training,
loyalty, discipline and, hopefully, winning. Interference with these compo-
nents of sport compromises the goal and lessons of athletics and is, therefore,
of interest to not only coaches, but often to athletic departments as well. Even
coaches in smaller Division I schools are often relieved of their duties if they
are unable to maintain team chemistry, keep students well trained or condi-
tioned, or fail to win a sufficient number of games or conference champion-
ships. A successful athletic program is actually good for the entire school,
not just the athletes and teams. 146 Not only do alumni, regents, and current
students flourish when their teams are winning, but applications to institu-
tions and even national rankings often rise in proportion to athletic suc-
143. Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1190 (6th Cir. 1995) ("Unlike the
classroom teacher whose primary role is to guide students through the discus-
sion and debate of various viewpoints in a particular discipline, [the role of
coach] is to train his student athletes how to win on the court").
144. OHIO STATE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, supra note 97.
145. See, e.g., ARIZONA STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK, supra note 82, at 13. ("[iut
is the goal of every coach and student-athlete to compete for Pacific-10 and
NCAA championships.... [W]e want and expect to compete for champion-
ships at the University of Arizona.").
146. Matthew Denhart et al., The Academics Athletics Trade-off, CTR. FOR COLL.
AFFORDABILITY & PRODUCTIVITY 6 (2009), available at http://www.centerfor
collegeaffordability.org/uploads/athletics.pdf.
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cess. 147 Thus, it may come as little surprise that the football and men's
basketball coaches at state universities are often the highest paid individuals
in the state.148
Should coaches do whatever is ethically and lawfully necessary to ac-
complish athletic success and team unity when the goals are teamwork, phys-
ical training, and winning recognizing that athletic success generates stronger
student applications? Under a content-neutral time, place, and manner analy-
sis, are team unity, chemistry, and teamwork important government interests
sufficient to limit speech and expression rights of students? After all, coaches
are expected to do everything in their power to focus the team's energy to
unite the team so it can perform at its highest level. This is the social media
quandary. This is the context under which any legal assessment of college
athletics should begin.149
If teamwork and athletic success matter, rules and regulations need to
focus on behaviors that impact these attributes. For example, student athletes
that are of legal age and capable of drinking alcohol are forced to choose
between drinking and participating in athletics solely because they are stu-
dent-athletes.150 Likewise, the NCAA prohibits athletes from using any form
of tobacco, including smokeless tobacco. 15 Why are scholars not lining up to
challenge these regulations as violations of the rights of student-athletes?
While the state has a strong interest in the physical well-being of student-
athletes, which is why regulations allow for random drug testing, that same
interest does not necessarily support regulations over alcohol and tobacco.
In addition to these health regulations, coaches and athletic departments
can require student-athletes to carry higher minimum grade point averages
than those mandated of students in the general university community.152 Uni-
versities also regularly mandate hours in study hall.153 Assistant coaches and
other employees of the athletic department monitor class attendance of stu-
dent-athletes. Failure to attend class can lead to suspension or expulsion from
147. Id.
148. See Infographic: Is Your State's Highest Paid Employee A Coach (Probably),
DEADSPIN (May 9, 2013), http://deadspin.com/infographic-is-your-states-high
est-paid-employee-a-co-489635228.
149. Penrose, supra note 133 (manuscript at 18).
150. CLEMSON STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK, supra note 28; VIRGINIA TECH
STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 2; OHIO STATE STUDENT-
ATHLETE HANDBOOK, supra note 64.
151. Id.
152. See NCAA, GET THE GRADES, http://blog.ncaa.org/GetTheGrades/#gpa (last
visited Apr. 4, 2015).
153. See NCAA DIVISION I ACADEMIC PROGRESS RATE IMPROVEMENT PLANS 1-2,
available at https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Addressing%2Bthe%2B
Most%2BCommon%2BEligibility%2Band%2BRetention%2BIssues.pdf (last
visited Apr. 3, 2015).
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the team.154 Student-athletes are not merely students or athletes. As a hybrid
category, student-athletes are unique individuals who merit a new constitu-
tional test that appreciates the distinctions between the typical college student
and the prize recruit that may increase the institution's national attention
through their athletic success. 55
Authors who write and strive to solve the free speech question unrealis-
tically rely on a line of First Amendment cases related to whether a student's
speech caused a material disruption to the school.156 But this paradigm, first
presented in Tinker v. Des Moines, applied to the classroom setting and not
the playing field.157 The question in Tinker was one of a positive learning
environment, not the need for teamwork, sacrifice, discipline, and athletic
success. 58 Those relying on Tinker have lost sight of the overriding goals of
sport. In the most literal sense, these authors have "taken their eyes off the
ball." Such a myopic view fails to appreciate the unique nature of a locker
room, team bus, and field of play. Currently, there is no clear analogy to
consider when assessing the First Amendment rights of student-athletes at
public universities to use social media. The Tinker line of cases, usually re-
served for kindergarten through high school, seems particularly inapt because
the reason coaches limit social media has little to do with education and
everything to do with sport. Tinker assesses whether a particular activity or
expression might substantially disrupt the school setting or the classroom.159
But a classroom is not a locker room.160 An auditorium speech made by a
student vying for student council is unrelated to athlete seeking to claim a
conference or individual championship in a 20,000seat gym or a 100,000seat
stadium. 161
The time, place, and manner cases are more appropriate to evaluate con-
tent-neutral speech restrictions.162 Tinker and its progeny exhibit a narrow
function that focuses on classroom disruption and the educational process.163
154. Id. at 5.
155. See, e.g., Hill, v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 658 (Cal.
1994) (underscoring that unlike traditional college students, student athletes
subject themselves to "special regulation of sleep habits, diet, fitness, and other
activities that intrude significantly on privacy interests ... not shared by other
students or the population at large").
156. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
157. See id. at 506.
158. Id. at 508.
159. Id. at 506.
160. Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1190 (1995).
161. Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2001).
162. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 640
(1981).
163. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.
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The locker room chalkboard is dramatically different from the classroom
chalkboard. The study of statistics as a discipline is entirely distinct from the
evaluation of an individual's game statistics. Unlike Tinker, which covers a
very narrow setting, analysis under time, place, and manner is trans-substan-
tive. The time, place and manner test focuses on content-neutrality and the
government's limited right to regulate speech in any setting, including tradi-
tionally protected public forums.164 This analysis considers an individual's
individual speech rights (which always merit some level of protection) in
light of the broader community needs.165
And, unlike Tinker and its progeny, time, place, and manner cases have
a rich history of application in a variety of settings. "Expression, whether
oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place,
or manner restrictions."66 The starting place for time, place, or manner re-
strictions is whether the regulation is content-neutral.167 In other words, the
state must demonstrate that its desire to regulate or limit speech is discon-
nected from any "disagreement with the message presented."68 "The princi-
pal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in
time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has
164. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) ("[Elven in a public forum
the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or man-
ner of protected speech, provided the restrictions 'are justified without refer-
ence to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alter-
native channels for communication of the information."'); see also Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989) ("The principal justification
for the sound-amplification guideline is the city's desire to control noise levels
at bandshell events ...and it satisfies the requirement that time, place, or
manner regulations be content neutral"); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Vio-
lence, et al., 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984) ("We have difficulty, therefore, in un-
derstanding why the prohibition against camping, with its ban on sleeping
overnight, is not a reasonable time, place, or manner regulation that withstands
constitutional scrutiny"); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) ("The State's interest in maintaining the orderly
movement of the crowd at fair is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that a
time, place, or manner restriction must serve a significant governmental inter-
est."); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) ("If a municipality
has authority to control the use of its public streets for parades or processions,
as it undoubtedly has, it cannot be denied authority to give consideration, with-
out unfair discrimination, to time, place and manner in relation to the other
proper uses of the streets.").
165. Ward, 491 U.S. at 796.
166. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
167. See id. at 295.
168. Id.
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adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it
conveys."169
Under a limited season-long ban or game day prohibition against using
social media, where all social media communications are prohibited, the stu-
dent-athlete cannot assert that the regulation is content-based.170 In contrast
to the numerous content-based restrictions contained in student-athlete
speech codes discussed above, athletic departments that forbid all social me-
dia during a discrete period appropriately steer clear from delving into which
specific words are more palatable to the school or acceptable to outside audi-
ences. The Supreme Court generally strikes down prohibitions of speech
based on message content, similar to the no display of weapons social-media
policy in place at Utah State.l71 "[A]bove all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."172
As a result, time limitations and situational prohibitions on student-ath-
letes using social media avoids any questions relating to restrictions based on
message or content of speech. 173 And, as the Supreme Court has explained,
"reasonable time, place, or manner regulations normally have the purpose
and direct effect of limiting expression but are nevertheless valid."' 74 College
athletic departments that impose social media bans are not doing so to con-
trol particular words, phrases, or even messages sent by their student-ath-
letes. Instead, coaches and athletic departments that bar social media usage
during the playing season, or at other specific times during the year, are try-
ing to control distractions. In-season social media bans operate regardless of
the message or communication's content and, thus, meet the first requirement
under a time, place and manner assessment of content-neutrality.175
Similar to the volume and noise complaints at issue in Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, a rationale of avoiding distractions to focus on winning has
"'nothing to do with content,' . . . and it satisfies the requirement that time,
169. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; see also Heffron, 452 U.S. at 648.
170. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 293-95.
171. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., id.
174. Clark, 468 U.S. at 294.
175. See, e.g., Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 804 (1984) (upholding a speech ordinance on the basis that "there is not
even a hint of bias or censorship in the City's enactment or enforcement of this
ordinance. There is no claim that the ordinance was designed to suppress cer-
tain ideas that the City finds distasteful or that it has been applied to appellees
because of the views that they express. The text of the ordinance is neutral-
indeed it is silent-concerning any speaker's point of view.").
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place, or manner regulations be content neutral."176 Much like the City of Los
Angeles banning the posting of all signs on public utility poles, athletic de-
partments do "no more than [is necessary to] eliminate the exact source of
the evil"; they seek to remedy distraction caused by social media.177 Since the
purpose is to avoid distractions that undermine athletic performance, season-
long bans of social media usage are likely valid under the first step, content-
neutrality, in a time, place, and manner review.
After a state regulation is deemed content neutral, courts will evaluate
whether the regulation is "narrowly tailored to serve a significant govern-
mental interest," and whether ample alternative channels of communication
remain open. 178 Each of the time, place, and manner restrictions are conjunc-
tive requirements, and each restriction is valid if the restriction is content
neutral, narrowly tailored, and other channels remain open. 179 It is not
enough to simply claim content neutrality, as the courts will assess the re-
striction's purpose and alternative speech opportunities.180 A state actor must
take steps to regulate narrowly and to ensure its restrictions on speech are no
broader "than necessary to protect the [state] interest."81
An important issue to consider is how courts assess the narrowly tai-
lored requirement. Essentially, narrowly tailored is a question of fit. It is
critical to note, in this instance, that individuals appreciate that narrowly tai-
lored under time, place and manner is not identical to narrowly tailored under
strict scrutiny review. Time, place, and manner restrictions are far closer to
intermediate review, in constitutional parlance, than strict scrutiny. In fact,
courts reviewing speech restrictions with regard to time, place, and manner
need not assess whether the restriction is the "least intrusive means of fur-
thering [a] legitimate governmental interest."82 Rather, courts will look for
some demonstrated effort to properly constrain the restriction so as to not
overly impact speech and expression.83
In college athletics, the governmental interest of successful athletic per-
formance is pursued by ensuring that the team and its individual players are
focused on the sport and team, rather than social media and the individual.
Another way of framing the government's interest is that athletic depart-
ments and their coaches seek to enhance athletic performance by minimizing
176. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789-90 (1989).
177. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 80.
178. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 815 (finding a Los Angeles ordi-
nance constitutional after considering content neutrality and the availability of
alternative channels of communication.).
181. Id. at 808.
182. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789-90, 797 (1989).
183. See id. at 789.
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distractions. All the ingredients necessary for successful athletic perform-
ance, including team work, sacrifice of self for team, and discipline, are the
governmental interests that are at stake. While some scholars might question
the value of these interests, the varied benefits of a successful collegiate ath-
letic program, for both individual athletes and institutions, are beyond dis-
pute.184 The benefits of a successful athletic program are far more important,
and transformative, than merely securing a conference championship. In-
stead, success on the court (or field) leads to an enhanced academic reputa-
tion and greater alumni support, which generally raises a university's overall
profile.185 The lessons learned in athletics regarding teamwork, which in-
cludes getting along with various types of people, selflessness, discipline,
reliability, being on time, working hard, accepting failure, learning to deal
with success, and physical well-being are lessons that stay with the athlete.
The unique lessons learned from participation in collegiate athletics are
broader than, and different from, those imparted in an academic classroom.
New York City in Ward advanced the governmental interest of noise
control in and around Central Park.186 If volume control and the aesthetics of
music are deemed adequately strong governmental interests, constitutionally
speaking, one would think that the secondary benefits and educational value
transcending academics flowing from the billion-dollar industry of collegiate
athletics are also sufficiently important governmental interests. 8 7 Addition-
ally, if a City can ban the eyesores of public utility poles with placards and
signs for purely aesthetic reasons, then an athletic department should have
the right to ask their athletes to temporarily forgo posting on social media for
team unity reasons. Postings on social media, which are potentially viewed
by millions of people, are every bit as distracting as signs or placards on
public utility poles.SS
Athletic programs, particularly successful athletic programs, increase
the state's interest in education and teach lessons of confidence and team-
work that are unique to athletes.189 It is hard to argue that lessons of team-
184. See Michael L. Anderson, The Benefits of College Athletic Success: An Appli-
cation of the Propensity Score Design with Instrumental Variables, 3-18
(NBER Working Paper, No. 18196, June 2012), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w18196 (explaining that for more prominent colleges,
particularly the FBS schools, winning increases athletic donations, improves
school reputation, raises entering students' test scores, and increases student
applications.).
185. See id. at 18.
186. Ward, 491 U.S. at 796.
187. See id. at 796-97 ("[T]he city's interest in ensuring the sufficiency of sound
amplification at bandshell events is a substantial one.").
188. See Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
807 (1984).
189. See Anderson, supra note 184, at 3.
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work, sacrifice, and discipline, an improvement of educational opportunities,
and the prioritization of the physical well-being of student-athletes at state
universities are anything but significant governmental interests. Sport is not
primarily about speech or individuality, but is instead about structure, sacri-
fice, teamwork, and, ultimately, successful performance.
After a strong governmental interest is demonstrated, courts will then
consider whether the interest "would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation."1 90 As Justice Kennedy stated in Ward:
[T]his standard does not mean that a time, place, or manner regu-
lation may burden substantially more speech than is necessary to
further the government's legitimate interests. Government may
not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion
of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals .... So
long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than neces-
sary to achieve the government's interest, however, the regulation
will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the gov-
ernment's interest could be adequately served by some less-
speech-restrictive alternative.91
In the athletic context, courts generally give latitude to state athletic depart-
ments. 192 Coaches, not courts, are in a better position to assess what distrac-
tions impact their student-athletes and which team rules actually ensure
athletic success. Some teams will require greater regulation than others.
Temporary bans of certain social media usage will be deemed constitutional,
provided the state is not regulating more speech than is necessary. The bur-
den falls on the state to demonstrate that it is curtailing no more speech than
is necessary.1 93 As a result, the narrowly tailored element requires a con-
scious attempt to limit no more speech and expressive activity than is neces-
sary to ensure team unity and successful athletic performance. The primary
consideration becomes whether the regulation "targets and eliminates no
more than the exact source of the 'evil' it seeks to remedy."194
Here, the "evil" targeted in the collegiate athletics environment is the
high level of distraction and team disruption that results from social media.
For example, one study indicated that student athletes reported checking their
respective social media accounts "frequently throughout the day, ranging
190. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.
191. Id. at 799-800.
192. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 471 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653-57 (1995)
("First and Fourteenth Amendment rights are different in public schools than
elsewhere" because the schools' custodial and tutelary responsibility for chil-
dren cannot be disregarded.).
193. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1988).
194. Id. at 485.
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from twenty to hundreds of times each day."195 The time each athlete spent
checking his or her social media accounts is time that students could, and
should, focus on sport and team activities. State university regulations,
through coaches or athletic department bans on social media, certainly fur-
ther the state interest of keeping athletes focused on their sport and team
performance rather than on self-promotion. Absent these bans, coaches will
find themselves competing for their athletes' attention and reacting to social
media distractions.
A season-long ban effectively eliminates the "evils" resulting from so-
cial media distractions while remaining sufficiently narrow to pass legal
scrutiny. Depending on the sport, season-long social media bans span only a
few months while also ensuring the elimination of one, rather consuming,
distraction. A social media-based controversy can engulf athletes, distract
teams, and derail entire seasons. A simple, season-long social media ban is a
limited regulation targeted at the source of these "evils." Courts will likely
find such limited social media bans sufficiently narrowly tailored.
The final requirement under a time, place and manner assessment is that
alternative channels of communication must remain open. 196 In every athletic
ban publically described thus far, the target is social media, particularly
Facebook and Twitter, not communication generally. Coaches have not
banned Instagram or other quickly developing social media outlets. Facebook
and Twitter are two common, but interchangeable, outlets for communicating
with friends, fans, and family members. The state is not regulating generic
attempts to communicate with individuals or prohibiting any individual com-
munication or message. Instead, through coaches and athletic departments,
the state seeks to minimize the high level of distraction that these two partic-
ular mediums pose.
Coaches and athletic departments seeking to cabin their athletes' dis-
tractions on social media must still ensure that other viable forms of commu-
nication remain open. 97 In our highly mobile and technological society, this
is an easy task. Smart phones permit student athletes to phone, text, email,
Facetime, Viber, Skype, and otherwise communicate with a multitude of in-
dividuals. Thus, a student athlete can still communicate with fans, but he or
she will do so in a much more narrow and targeted fashion. Rather than
simply sending a message into the Twitterverse, the student athlete will only
communicate directly with those whose personal information he or she has.
This precludes student athletes from constantly checking how many more
virtual "friends" and "followers" have accumulated. With the distraction
eliminated, the athletes' eyes and attention are now firmly on their sport.
195. Blair Browning & Jimmy Sanderson, The Positives and Negatives of Twitter:
Exploring How Student Athletes Use Twitter And Respond to Critical Tweets, 5
INT'L J. SPORTS COMM. 503, 509 (2002).
196. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481.
197. Id.
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Critically, banning Twitter, Facebook, or similar social media platforms
does absolutely nothing to limit "the more general dissemination of a mes-
sage."198 Student-athletes can still say whatever they want to say to whom-
ever they want to say it. They can still call their friends, attend press
conferences, send emails and text-messages, or even hold up a placard in
protest. The limited social media bans temporarily foreclose the student-ath-
lete from using a particular communication outlet, not from communicating
generally, representing a critical and constitutionally significant difference.199
Fans decry these limited social-media ban because they potentially min-
imize a student athlete's communication with unknown individuals. Such
limitations protect the athlete and athletic program but disappoint fans who
relish raw social media communications. These individuals are not truly
"friends" but are often "followers." In this regard, there is the added benefit
of advancing student welfare by protecting student athletes from unknown
individuals (who are only familiar with the student because of the team he or
she represents) possibly seeking to harm, harangue, or distract the student-
athlete from winning.
The inability to know with whom you are communicating is one of the
greatest risks of social media. At any time and for any reason, an individual
can assume a false identity. This aspect of social media poses particular dan-
gers to high profile individuals, especially vulnerable student-athletes whose
egos and confidence may wane with each athletic contest. Coaches seeking
to shield their players from hecklers and predators may see a need to limit
social media contacts. Limiting student-athletes' access to particular medi-
ums of communication poses no constitutional impediment if coaches do not
ban the general dissemination of student-athletes' messages or interfere with
their general ability to communicate. Regulations on reasonable time, place
and manner have long withstood constitutional scrutiny and should be ap-
plied to assess the constitutional propriety of limited season-long social me-
dia bans.
V. LiKE, FOLLOW, OR PLAY: THE CHOICE CAN CONSTITUTIONALLY
BE IMPOSED
Social media provides a unique opportunity to individuals. At any time,
any person-without training or experience-can espouse ideas about abso-
lutely anything and communicate those ideas, informed or not, to the entire
world. While this freedom of communication and expression seems positive,
such omnipresent expression, combined with a drive to "like" or gain
"friends" and "followers," may foster a strain of narcissism that leads to
greater emphasis on the individual rather than the team. Such self-involved
expression is antithetical to team and possibly detrimental to sport. Thus, as
individuals discuss the larger issue of whether a college coach or athletic
198. Id. at 483.
199. See id. at 481-83.
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director can place restrictions on social media usage, it is imperative to keep
the underlying team notion of sport clearly in the equation.
Social media has undoubtedly altered our collective existence. Many
Americans now have a Facebook or Twitter account, or even multiple ac-
counts.00 One cannot travel anywhere without seeing people "checking"
their phones for messages and social media updates. Americans fervently like
"posting" their whereabouts ("Leaving DFW for the Nation's Capital!"),
meals (think back to the last time you checked your Facebook page, surely
you recall someone posting pictures of their most recent meal), workouts
("Made it through a 5-mile run in horrible heat and humidity! July in Texas
is soooooo brutal!"), and everything in between. Using social media, many
Americans live their lives out loud to entire communities of known and un-
known followers. Perhaps the most accurate assessment is that social media
provides individuals with the opportunity and tools to direct and star in their
own live-streaming reality network.
This constant live-streaming is not typical in sports where team prac-
tices, meetings, and meals are often closed to the public or entirely private.
Although some public showings occur, (midnight practices, team camps,
press conferences, etc.) coaches and staff carefully orchestrate these events to
conceal strategic details and maintain team chemistry. Further, outside com-
municating with cell phones or other electronic devices during team events is
contrary to the notion that time spent together as a team is usually dedicated
to some form of training, practice, or bonding. The distracted athlete is prob-
ably not a good teammate or performer. Moreover, at the heart of athletics is
the expectation that an individual sacrifices his or her time and energy for the
good of the team and love of the sport, and social media interferes with this
core tenet.
Despite all the rhetoric about purported free speech rights of student-
athletes, college athletes live regimented lives, often abiding by schedules
and structures dictated by their coaches and university athletic department.
One of the primary goals of coaching is to limit, to the extent possible, the
number of distractions facing a team as the team prepares for competition.
Coaches limit access to the players, the individuals who travel with the team,
and they even limit players' access to meals while traveling. Separate rules
and schedules, far more demanding than those imposed on the average col-
lege student, bind athletes and their teammates. Serious athletes make many
sacrifices and devote their entire lives to sport.
Any author who might intimate that athletes are indistinguishable from
traditional college students does not appreciate the lives of modern college
athletes. The higher profile teams often stay in local hotels the night before a
game to ensure that athletes focus on the upcoming game rather than frater-
nity parties or other college festivities. Even small Division I or successful
200. See generally Social Networking Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, http://
www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/ (last visited
Apr. 3, 2015).
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Division II programs seek to isolate athletes' attention before games, either
through team meals or through pregame meetings. A life dedicated to sport
teaches athletes to focus. Any argument suggesting twenty-first century stu-
dent-athletes are incapable of living without various forms of social media,
even for limited periods, belies the focal ability of the true athlete-even in
the era of Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. Athletes must focus and they
must concentrate. Experience trains athletes to block out hundreds, even
thousands, of voices taunting them while lining up for a game-winning field
goal, a critical free-kick, or a pivotal free throw. Competitive sports train
athletes' minds to see the world differently and to focus on very precise tasks
while the rest of the world seeks to distract them.
Some commentators may be tempted to suggest that coaches cannot
control their athletes' social media because athletes will just make up fake
accounts and defy the coach's rules regardless of the consequences. Such an
assertion is hard to accept if the thesis is that an individual who has sacrificed
years of training and practice to gain a spot on Ohio State's football team or
Florida State's basketball team would risk all that success and notoriety sim-
ply to post social media comments. Such rhetoric, and the correlative view-
point, does not consider the important influence of collegiate athletic
training. Also, this rhetoric is probably colored by participation in a profes-
sion dependent on social media or perspective devoid of college athletic
training. Speaking from experience, signing a National Letter of Intent to
participate in college athletics is the pinnacle of success for most athletes.
Participating on a team and wearing a school's uniform is a hard earned
privilege, not something to be recklessly cast aside, even for Facebook and
Twitter. The sacrifice and the years of mental and physical training likely
explain why no college athlete has filed suit challenging the few social media
bans in existence.
While some authors proclaim that any limitations placed upon college
athletes' social media usage violates the First Amendment, such bold pro-
nouncements fail to appreciate the unique nature of athletics.201 Even in a
world bound by Constitutional rights, from an early age, competitive athletes
face coaches' rules that apply only to the team and athletes. In short, college
athletes are special and different, and their First Amendment rights are as
unique as the many benefits they receive from voluntarily participating in
sport.
Whether the Supreme Court, or even an appellate court, will ever ad-
dress the issue of college athletes and social media limitations remains an
unanswered question. Thus far, athletes at top tier state universities appear
willing to forego a little social media privilege for the long-sought opportu-
nity to represent a major institution like Texas A&M, Michigan, or Louis-
201. See, e.g., J. Wes Gay, Hands Off Twitter: Are NCAA Student-Athlete Social
Media Bans Unconstitutional?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 804-05 (2012)
("The recent bans on social media speech that public universities and college
coaches have forced on student-athletes are likely unconstitutional.").
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ville. To even bring the question before a court a willing plaintiff actually
impacted by the coach's social media restrictions must challenge the policy.
This has not yet happened. Instead, athletes appear willing to work with any
imposed restrictions and abide by their coaches, conference, and NCAA's
regulations relating to speech and expression.
Fully appreciating an athlete's tolerance for limited speech and self-ex-
pression requires an understanding and appreciation of the sporting life. By
the time an athlete arrives at the college level, he or she is already accus-
tomed to a very structured lifestyle. Most students who have successfully
participated in team sports and become collegiate athletes are accustomed to
team regulations and league rules. To even qualify for participation, the
NCAA requires students to complete certain courses in high school. Colleges
generally accept students with high school degrees and certain test scores,
but the NCAA requires more, including a minimum GPA and certain test
scores.
20 2
Before any court rules on the social media limitations, the court and any
prospective plaintiffs should peruse the existing sportsmanship policies from
every NCAA conference, the omnipresent Student-Athlete Codes of Conduct
and Handbooks, and the NCAA's academic qualification requirements. As
set forth above, the NCAA, coaches, and college institutions have severely
restricted NCAA athletes' First Amendment rights. However, this author is
aware of no litigation challenging these restrictions. As shown above,
schools and the NCAA currently enforce bans, rules, and policies that limit
vulgar or obscene language, preclude derogatory comments about competi-
tors and officials, and forbid media interviews without school approval.
While fans surely desire their favorite athletes to post regular updates
about themselves, coaches and universities prefer that athletes keep their eyes
(and fingers) on the ball. From the college and coaches' perspective, speech
that distracts from the team could be speech that destroys an entire season.
But, for each limitation or sacrifice an athlete faces, there are equal benefits
to be had. Even for those not receiving some form of scholarship, athletic
programs frequently provide free tutoring, school gear, travel, healthcare,
physical training, nutrition advice, and countless other sport accouterments.
Considering the numerous benefits that flow to the student-athlete, participat-
ing in collegiate athletics truly is, and universities proclaim, a privilege.
Thus, when considering the constitutionality of limits and regulations im-
posed on student-athletes, courts must place the issue of student-athletes' so-
cial media use in proper context.
For better or worse, college athletics is about successful athletic per-
formance and winning. Courts should allow state universities to place limited
bans on their student-athletes' social media usage under a proper time, place,
and manner analysis to keep student-athletes distraction to a minimum. As
this article demonstrates, speech restrictions already exist for student-ath-
202. See NCAA ELIGIBILITY, CENTER QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE, available at http://
fs.ncaa.org/Docs/eligibility-center/QuickReferenceSheet.pdf.
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letes. Limiting when the student-athlete can enjoy the right to free speech-
rather than fixating on content-offers a far more palatable, and arguably
constitutional, resolution than the existing policies curtailing speech and ex-
pression with false claims of protections. Chances are quite strong that when
faced with the question, the Supreme Court will find that the privilege of
participating in college athletics does in fact provide universities the right to
limit, under valid time, place and manner regulations, their student-athletes'
ability to share stupid shit with "friends" and "followers."
